Abstract: Given the importance of developing a democratic culture for the long-term survival of democracy, it is crucial to understand how support for democracy changes over time in response to different events. Although democratic transitions vary greatly by case, one common element to each transition, and often the first major event signaling a transition, is the holding of a reasonably free and fair election. Yet, while there is a significant literature on the effect of elections on public opinion in developed democracies, this topic has received far less attention in transitioning and authoritarian countries. This paper addresses this hole in the literature by examining the effects of the first relatively free and fair election in a country's history on support for democracy among ordinary citizens. It finds that groups that are excluded from participation in the election and individuals who believe that an election was not free and fair also lose support for democracy. 
Introduction
Public support for democracy is necessary for the long-term success of a democratic political system. As expressed by Diamond, democratic survival requires that "all significant political actors, at both the elite and mass levels, believe that the democratic regime is the most right and appropriate for their society, better than any other realistic alternative they can imagine" (1999, 65) . This support is particularly critical when there is significant disagreement pertaining to policy or leadership. For democracy to survive, most individuals in a society must agree to abide by the rules of the game and accept that their policy or leadership preferences will not always prevail.
Proper institutions are also critical for the success of democracy. As expected, empirical research reports a strong correlation between the development of the appropriate institutions and institutional arrangements, on the one hand, and, on the other, the success or failure of democratic transitions around the globe (Stepan and Skach 1993) . But proper institutions, while necessary, are not sufficient for successful democratization. Rose et al. (1998) suggest in this connection that the relationship between institutional arrangements and citizen attitudes is comparable to the relationship between hardware and software in the working of a computer, democratic institutions being the hardware and public support for democracy being the software.
Thus, again, though also not sufficient, public support for democratic governance is essential for the functioning and long-term survival of a democratic political system.
While support for democracy tends to be reasonably stable in consolidated democracies, the stability of attitudes toward democracy in non-democratic or transitioning societies is less well understood. In cases where citizens are experiencing elements of democratic governance
The assertion that pro-democracy attitudes lag among non-elites and for the most part emerge during a democratic transition is not supported by empirical evidence, however. Data from the World Values Survey indicate that stated support for democracy is widespread in nondemocratic countries among almost all segments of society. Indeed, this support is often higher than in consolidated democracies (Inglehart 2003) . Widespread popular support for democracy is also reported in studies based on surveys in the Arab world (Tessler and Gao 2005) . Even though there is some variation and imprecision in the way that democracy is understood by ordinary citizens (Jamal and Tessler 2008) , there is broad public in support for democracy in countries where there has not been significant democratization or political reform.
Support for democracy in undemocratic or quasi-democratic countries probably reflects discontent with the status quo and a desire for a system of government that provides for greater political accountability and responsiveness to ordinary citizens. This support may be somewhat tenuous, however. Accordingly, if this is indeed the case, and if progress toward democracy does not lead to a perceived improvement in the political or economic situation, citizens may begin to question the belief that they and their country would be well-served by a democratic political system.
Research in post-Communist Eastern Europe provides support for this proposition. Rose et al. (1998) report that evaluations of the former Communist regime are heavily influenced by demographic factors and personal circumstances, such as education, urbanization, deprivation, and income. Assessments of performance are relatively unimportant. Evaluations of the new regime, by contrast, are highly dependent on perceived performance in both political and economic realm. Individuals who have favorable opinions about economic policy and the political situation are disproportionally likely to prefer the new democratic regime to the previous, undemocratic alternative. Level of support for democracy is thus determined to a significant degree by judgments about whether democracy is meeting expectations.
These theoretical and empirical observations suggest that individual-level support for democracy in non-democratic countries is a dynamic phenomenon and that it increases or decreases as a function of experiences and perceptions relating the workings of democratic institutions and procedures. If a democratic political system is well-established, then support for democracy may be relatively stable. On the other hand, in cases where citizens have had little direct experience with democracy, or in which democratic institutions are new or only beginning to take form, attitudes toward democracy may be much less stable and may vary in response to important events.
Elections and Support for Democracy
Elections are generally considered to be one of the most basic and important institutions of democratic governance. In fact, Schumpeter's minimalist definition of democracy focuses solely on the existence of competitive elections. However, free and fair elections are often a new experience for the citizens of non-democratic countries. While they may have experienced elections previously, elections in authoritarian systems are almost always controlled, manipulated or otherwise not genuinely competitive (Brooker 2000) . Thus, in the context of a democratic transition, in which a supposedly free and fair election is often the first institution of democratic governance that the public experiences, the judgments that people make about this election may have a significant effect on levels of support for democracy.
Additionally, elections in new or emerging democracies are likely to be particularly critical. Bratton et al. (2005) argue, for example, that in transitioning systems elections help determine which party is able to create formal institutions and determine the way these institutions function. These decisions greatly affect the nature of the political system, meaning that the first few elections have higher stakes than those that take place after democracy has become institutionalized. Further, patronage is more common in transitioning countries, and the outcome of elections can thus heavily skew the distribution of state resources. As such, Bratton et al. conclude that elections may be polarizing in new democracies or transitioning countries, particularly if they are not judged to be genuinely free and fair.
While the preceding suggests that the electoral outcomes are the key element of elections, others argue that the election process may be as important, if not more so. As explained by Sisk and Reynolds (1998) 
The election process is often misperceived as a rather simple, single-moment, horse race-type event-the actual balloting and the intriguing issue of who 'wins' and who 'loses'-rather than as a varied set of events and decisions leading up to elections that have long-lasting consequences once the proverbial dust has settled.
(13-4) While the election may help define which party or faction assumes power, the election process defines the arena of political contestation and establishes the rules of the political game, and it thus has important implications beyond the final vote count. If a group finds that it has been excluded from participating in a political process that is said to be "democratic," or at least believes it has been unfairly disadvantaged in comparison to others, then support for democracy is likely to diminish among its adherents. Accordingly, quite apart from the outcome of an election, the way that individuals or groups experience and assess the electoral process is likely to have an important impact on support for democracy in a transitioning country.
The limited empirical evidence that exists about the importance of the electoral process in transitioning countries offers some support to this assessment. In a paper using data from the Afrobarometer, Moehler (2005) finds that the quality of the electoral process is a critical determinant of the way that supporters of the losing party evaluate the legitimacy of the election.
When the process is viewed as free and fair, she reports, there is a smaller gap in the perceived legitimacy of the outcome of the election between those supporting the winning and losing parties.
In sum, the existing literature suggests that judgments about the electoral process, as well as electoral outcomes, are an important factor in determining the legitimacy of an election and of the regime. However, there remains no evidence bearing directly on the relationship between electoral experience and support for democracy despite the fact that this is clearly an important area for empirical investigation. In particular, it is important to determine whether the substantial support for democracy that exists in many undemocratic countries either persists or diminishes as a result of the way that citizens experience and evaluate elections that the country's leaders associate with movement toward democracy. Toward this end, the analysis to be presented will test the following hypothesis:
H 1 : In a non-consolidated democracy, support for democracy will decrease among individuals who perceive an election to be less free and fair.
External Factors
Events beyond the domestic political arena may also have an impact on the way that citizens think about governance. In Algeria and other Arab countries, developments associated with U.S. foreign policy have been particularly prominent during the early years of the 21 st century and offer an opportunity to examine the relationship between perceptions of international and regional events and support for democracy. On the one hand, the United States has launched a major initiative, in part through the Department of State's Middle East Partnership Initiative, dedicated to democracy promotion in the Arab world. On the other, the Administration of U.S. President George W. Bush defended its invasion and occupation of Iraq as part of its campaign to advance democracy in the Middle East. Thus, it is possible that attitudes toward democracy among men and women in the Arab world will be influenced by the judgments they make about the actions and policies of the U.S. that are affecting their region.
Given that the war in Iraq has for the most part been unpopular in the Arab world, as is U.S. foreign policy more generally, some analysts have suggested that U.S. actions have spawned a backlash that is leading many ordinary citizens to question whether democracy is appropriate for their country. This view is expressed by Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in the following terms:
Bush's policy has done serious damage to the legitimacy of democracy promotion in the eyes of the world and the U.S. public. The constant identification of democracy promotion with the war in Iraq, a war on terrorism that seems to involve serious abuses by the U.S. of the rule of law, has contaminated the whole domain (Kuhar 2007) . Not all analysts agree with this thesis. Some argue that U.S. policies have advanced the cause of democracy in the Arab world and elsewhere and that many ordinary citizens, even if they oppose the war in Iraq, understand that American efforts at democracy promotion have helped to bring about political reform and make governments in a number of Middle Eastern countries more responsive to their citizens. Arguments along these lines have been put forward by Vin Weber, head of the National Endowment for Democracy, Frances Fukuyama, and other foreign policy specialists who are generally supportive of U.S. foreign policy (Kuhar 2007) . In the view of these observers, the concept of democracy has not been "contaminated" by U.S. action, meaning that there is no reason to believe that disapproval of U.S. policies and actions relating to the Middle East and North Africa is likely to diminish support for democracy among people in the region.
To test these competing assessments, and to shed light more generally on the possibility that judgments about important international and regional developments have an impact on views about governance and democracy, the analysis to be presented will test the following hypothesis:
H 2 : In a country affected by U.S. democracy promotion efforts and the war in Iraq, support for democracy will decrease among individuals who have a more unfavorable view of U.S. foreign policy.
The Algerian Case
In order to evaluate the effect of the quality of an election on support for democracy, we examine the case of Algeria. While Algeria is not generally considered a democracy (Freedom Unlike in the past, the armed forces stated their neutrality rather than supporting a presidential candidate as they had in the past. As such, when the election was first announced, it appeared to most Algerians that this process would be the most open election they had ever experienced.
While the election process proved to have significant shortcomings, this change still represented a major break from the nature of past elections in Algeria.
Moreover, it is also one of the few cases where survey data currently exist both before and after an election of this nature. Given that it is not usually considered a democratic country, it is possible to observe if and how this more open election changed the nature of support for democracy in Algeria. As such, it provides a strong case with which to test the effect of an election on support for democracy in a non-democratic setting.
In the election, the incumbent candidate, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was seeking reelection. During his first term from 1999 to 2004, Bouteflika proved to be a capable and popular leader (Martín 2003; Bouandel 2002) . He was able to end the civil war by creating an amnesty program for all but the worst offenders in the conflict. On other fronts, the rising price of hydrocarbons on the world market stabilized Algeria's previously weak economy. However, Bouteflika's relationship with the military establishment became strained during his presidency.
Military leaders were largely unsupportive of Bouteflika's amnesty program for acts committed during the decade-long civil war, especially since it feared that military abuses committed during the conflict would come to light. Moreover, Bouteflika governed largely independently of military leaders, contrary to expectations when he was given their blessing for the office of the presidency.
Largely as a result, as noted above, the military announced not only that it was not endorsing Bouteflika's bid for reelection in 2004, and that it would also not support any other candidate. Even more important, the military stated that it would accept the election of any candidate, even an Islamist. Given the military's involvement in the political realm since independence, this announcement led to hope in Algeria that this election would be the most free and fair election in the country's history (Bouandel 2004) .
Numerous candidates declared their intention to enter the race representing a wide variety of parties and ideologies. Of these candidates, all but three of the individuals who announced their candidacy met the qualifications to run. Although two of these individuals were considered minor candidates, the third, Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, was believed to be the strongest potential challenger to Bouteflika. Ibrahimi was generally considered to be a moderate Islamist who commanded widespread popularity throughout many segments of Algerian society. In fact, despite withdrawing from the 1999 presidential election he still received 1.2 million votes (12.5% of the valid vote). In light of Bouteflika's general popularity and the weakness of the other candidates, it was believed that Ibrahimi was the only candidate who could garner enough support to at least force a second round of elections (Bouandel 2004 ).
Ibrahimi was prevented from running on the basis that he did not collect the required 90,000 signatures as the Constitutional Commission claimed that many of the signatures his supporters presented were invalid. Given his popularity, this logic seemed implausible and it was widely suggested that the actual reason was his alleged links to the banned Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the group which had won the first round of balloting in the 1991 elections. Given
Ibrahimi's popularity, his exclusion on these grounds was particularly striking and strongly suggested political interference from Bouteflika who was responsible for appointing the Constitutional Commission. This perceived bias was only increased on Election Day when another candidate who had been allowed to run received 20,000 fewer than the signatures she had officially collected in order to stand in the election.
In the absence of Ibrahimi, Bouteflika's main challenger was Ali Benflis, a former Prime
Minister and close ally of Bouteflika prior to a falling out in 2003. Although Benflis heavily criticized Bouteflika and his policies throughout the campaign, these attacks were seen as empty given that the two had been close allies until only a year before the election. As such, some observers suggest that many Algerians came to view Benflis as a traitor and not a viable alternative for president (Bouandel 2004 In spite of the overwhelming margin of victory and claims to the contrary by losing candidates, it was generally accepted by local and international observers that the vote itself was largely free and fair, and that any minor irregularities that did exist would certainly not have altered the outcome (Bouandel 2004; Pierre-Louveaux 2004; Dillman 2005) . This fact combined with the neutrality of the armed forces, the inclusion of all but one major opposition candidates, and the lively campaign period, makes it reasonable to conclude that for Algerians, the 2004 election their most competitive complete election in history.
However, despite this improvement over previous elections, the nature of the electoral process was well short of being fully free and fair. Most notably, the exclusion of Ibrahimi from the election meant that the election was not fully competitive as one of the most important candidates was excluded. Nevertheless, the statements made by internal and external observers argued that the election was generally free and fair, at least on election day itself. As a result, while some ordinary Algerians may have believed that the election was reasonably free and fair, or at least an improvement from past elections, it is likely that Ibrahimi's supporters would view the election as being less free and fair than other members of society.
Data and Measures
As discussed above, the analysis to follow will examine two hypotheses:
In a non-consolidated democracy, support for democracy will decrease among individuals who perceive an election to be less free and fair. These items were combined into a dichotomous measure with one representing a higher level of support for democracy and zero a lower level of support for democracy. The measure was constructed such that individuals who answered agree or strongly agree to both items were coded as having a higher level of support for democracy and individuals who said disagree or strongly disagree to one or both items were coded as having a lower support for democracy.
This coding was used to ensure that individuals who responded inconsistently about their support for democracy were not included as being more highly supportive of this system of governance.
The distributions for this dependent variable are presented in Table 1 .
( Table 1 about here) While it would be possible to try to test of H 1 by evaluating whether an individual's rating of the fairness of the election was correlated with a lower level of support for democracy in a post-election survey, in reality this test would not be sufficient to claim that a lower rating of the election led to a decrease in support for democracy. Rather, it may be that individuals who were less supportive of democracy before the election would be predisposed to believe that the election was not free and fair. As a result, although a variable measuring the perceived quality of the election might be correlated with support for democracy, this finding would not be sufficient to conclude that the election was the primary cause of this relationship.
Rather, properly evaluating this hypothesis requires a comparison between attitudes both before and after the election to see if there was a change in relationships surrounding the election. Given that panel data does not exist for Algeria, it is impossible precisely identify the group of individuals would later the election as not being free and fair in the survey taken prior to the election. As such, an alternative manner must be employed to see if and how this relationship changed because of the election.
One such way is to identify a category of respondents that is likely to have a less ( How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statement?
Religious leaders should have no influence over the decisions of the government.
Although the interview schedules contained other items pertaining to political Islam, this item was selected because it has high face validity and because it captures the significant variation that exists in respondent attitudes toward political Islam. It was not combined with other items to form an index to minimize missing data.
Testing H 2 can be done in a more direct manner. In this case, it is necessary to determine if and how perceptions of actions undertaken by the U.S. in Algeria and the region at large affected support for democracy between these two years. If there proves to be difference in the relationship between attitudes toward U.S. actions and support for democracy during this time period, then this will provide evidence in favor of H 2 . In order to operationalize support for U.S.
actions in the region the following item will be used: This item was chosen in part because there was very little variation in responses to questions asking specifically about the war in Iraq. By contrast, there is reasonable variation in responses to the question asking about U.S. foreign policy in general, with a significant number of respondents in both the "some are good and some are bad" and the "almost all are bad"
categories. In addition, however, a question that asks about U.S. foreign policy in general appears to be more relevant given the American emphasis on democracy promotion not only as a justification for the war in Iraq but also as a major objective of U.S. policies and actions in the Middle East more broadly.
Multiple Regression Analysis
Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, a logistic regression technique is used to estimate the model by which hypotheses are tested. In addition to the items used to operationalize support for political Islam and judgments about U.S. foreign policy, education, income, sex, and age are included as control variables. The results of this model, with all variables standardized, are presented in Table 2 .
( Table 2 about here)
The results for 2002 indicate that democracy is equally supported among all the groups included in the model. In the case of support for political Islam, while the sign of the coefficient suggests that these individuals are somewhat less likely to be supportive of democracy, this finding is not significant at standard confidence levels. Thus, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that support for political Islam has no effect on support for democracy. With respect to H 2 , the sign of the coefficient estimate actually suggests that individuals who are less supportive of U.S. foreign policy tended to be more supportive of democracy in 2002, although this relationship again is not significant. Thus, it is not possible to reject the null in this case either. Additionally, the coefficients for the four control variables are not significant. between attitudes toward U.S. foreign policy and support for democracy was not significant. In 2004, this relationship did begin to approach standard levels of significance, however, and even more interestingly, the sign did not change, indicating that individuals who were less supportive of U.S. foreign policy continued to be more supportive of democracy. This suggests that while only a handful of the Algerians surveyed believed the U.S. to be doing the "right thing" in Iraq, this negative view did not necessarily give rise to a wholesale condemnation of U.S. foreign policy or produce a "contamination effect" that reduced support for democracy.
Also of interest is the significant relationship involving the control variable sex in 2004.
In that year, women were significantly more likely than men to be supportive of democracy. Overall, these findings provide support for the first of the two hypotheses being tested.
The evidence suggests that support for democracy declines among individuals whose viewpoints and preferences are excluded from the democratic process, and who thus see flaws in the institutions and procedures associated with democratization. Alternatively, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that discontent with U.S. foreign policy undermines support for democracy. The specific situation of the war in Iraq and American efforts at democracy promotion mean that findings about H 2 should be generalized with caution. Nevertheless, the present analysis does call into question the proposition that support for democracy is affected by international and regional as well as domestic developments.
An Additional Test
While The results of both models are presented in Table 3 .
( 
Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Research
Taken together, these findings clearly demonstrate that in non-democratic or transitioning countries the way an individual evaluates an election, a key institution of democracy, affects his or her attitude towards democracy. When an election is deemed as being generally free and fair by internal and external observers, citizens who believe the electoral process to be free and fair are more likely to continue to be more supportive of democracy, while those who believe the process to be fraudulent become less likely to be supportive. Thus, the present study strongly suggests that experience with democratic institutions and procedures directly affects support for democracy in non-consolidated democracies.
Viewed more broadly, these findings also suggest a number of additional insights. First, the present study suggests that support for democracy in authoritarian systems is widespread but shallow, which is consistent with findings from sub-Saharan Africa (see Bratton and Mattes 2001 Third, the present study suggests that the importance of elections in non-democratic countries lies less in the role they play in building popular support for democracy than in their ability to undermine support for democracy if they are perceived to not be free and fair.
International actors, including the U.S., as well as many NGOs, have pressed for elections in the Arab world and elsewhere. If these elections are controlled or manipulated, however, or at least are thus perceived, they have the potential to retard rather advance democratization. For this reason, groups pressing for elections in undemocratic or quasi-democratic countries should understand that a seriously flawed election may in some cases be worse than no election at all.
A final observation pertains to the relationship between political Islam and democracy. Future research should continue to trace the electoral process in Algeria, not only for purposes of replication but also to determine whether the impact of one election is reinforced or modified by subsequent elections and whether different kinds of elections have a similar or different impact on political attitudes about governance and democracy. Equally important, future studies should also investigate whether and how elections affect support for democracy in other political settings. This will shed light on the generalizeability of the findings from Algeria.
It will also offer insights about whether the connection between electoral experience and citizen attitudes varies as a function of degree of democracy, the partisan map, the electoral system, or other factors that may condition the way that elections and other events associated with democratization either strengthen or weaken the popular support for democracy that is necessary for democratic consolidation and survival. 
